Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2006

Mountain West Surgical Center, LLC and
Mountain West Medical Properties, LLC v.
Hospital Corporation of Utah, dba Lakeview
Hospital : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Craig G. Adamson; Craig A. Hoggan; Debra G. Griffiths; Dart, Adamson & Donovan; Counsel for
Plaintiffs/Appellants.
Andrew H. Stone; Marci Rechtenbach; Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough; Counsel for
Defendant/Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Mountain West Surgical Center v. Hospital Corporation of Utah, No. 20060243 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6336

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MOUNTAIN WEST SURGICAL
CENTER. LLC and
MOUNTAIN WEST MEDICAL
PROPERTIES, LLC.
Plaintiffs and Appellants.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Appellate Case No. 20060243-SC

V .

HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF
UTAH, dba LAKEVIEW HOSPITAL,
Defendant and Appellee.
Appeal from the Second District Court. Davis County. Utah
Judge Thomas L. Kay Presiding

Andrew J. Stone (4921)
Marci Rechienbach (8146)
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK &
MCDONOUGH
170 S. Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake Cit>. Utah 84101
Attorneys for Appellee Hospital
Corporation of Utah, dba Lake^iew
Hospital

Craig G. Adamson (00042)
Craig A. Hoggan (8202)
Debra G. Griffiths (83t>5)
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN
370 E. South Temple. Suite 400
Salt Lake City. UT 84111
Attorneys for Appellants Mountain West
Surgical Center, LLC and Mountainwesi
Medical Properties, LLC

FILED
UTAH APPELUTE COURTS

JUL28 2flflfi

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MOUNTAIN WEST SURGICAL
CENTER, LLC and
MOUNTAINWEST MEDICAL
PROPERTIES, LLC,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Appellate Case No. 20060243-SC

V.

HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF
UTAH, dba LAKEVIEW HOSPITAL,
Defendant and Appellee.
Appeal from the Second District Court, Davis County, Utah
Judge Thomas L. Kay Presiding

Andrew J. Stone (4921)
Marci Rechtenbach (8146)
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK &
McDONOUGH
170 S. Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Appellee Hospital
Corporation of Utah, dba Lakeview
Hospital

Craig G. Adamson (00042)
Craig A. Hoggan (8202)
Debra G. Griffiths (8365)
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN
370 E. South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for Appellants Mountain West
Surgical Center, LLC and Mountainwest
Medical Properties, LLC

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
ii
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
1
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
2
I. Nature of the Case
2
II. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
2
III. Statement of Facts
4
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
7
ARGUMENT
7
I. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY DENIED APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND GRANTED APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE LIS PENDENS
FILED BY DEFENDANT CANNOT FORM THE BASIS OF AN ABUSE OF PROCESS
CLAIM AS A MATTER OF LAW
7
8
A. Factual Basis for Mountain West's Abuse of Process Claim
B. Argument
8
1. Improper Use of Process
9
2. Ulterior Motive
11
II. THE TRIAL COURT IGNORED COMPETENT EVIDENCE IN FINDING THAT
APPELLANTS FAILED TO ESTABLISH AN ULTERIOR MOTIVE OR A WILLFUL
ACT NOT PROPER IN THE REGULAR COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
13
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT TESTIMONY FROM A
LENDER OR TITLE COMPANY ON THE IMPACT OF THE LIS PENDENS WAS
NECESSARY
14
IV. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE
UNDERLYING LAWSUIT COULD NOT FORM THE BASIS OF A TORTIOUS
INTERFERENCE CLAIM AS A MATTER OF LAW, BASED ON ITS CONCLUSION
THAT THE UNDERLYING LAWSUIT WAS PROTECTED BY THE JUDICIAL
PROCEEDING PRIVILEGE
15
V. THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT
APPELLANTS DID NOT FACTUALLY SUPPORT THEIR INTERFERENCE CLAIM
18
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT USED MOUNTAIN WEST'S FAILURE
TO MEET DISCOVERY DEADLINES AS A BASIS FOR GRANTING HCU'S
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION
21
A. Discovery issues had no bearing on the facts or issues before the court
22
B. There is no legal basis for the trial court's decision
23
CONCLUSION
23
ADDENDUM
26

l

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
8,9, 15, 17, 18, 19
Anderson Development Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, 116 P. 3d 323
Arnold Indus., Inc., v. Love, 2002 UT 133,1J11, 63 P.3d 721
1, 2
Bennett v. Jones Waldo, 70 P.3d 17 (Utah 2003)
18
Broadmoor Apartments of Charleston v. Horwitz,4l3 S.E.2d 9, (S.C. 1992)
12
Drake v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 939 P.2d 177 (UT 1997)
2
Hale v. Beckstead, 2005 UT, 24,1J2, 116 P.3d 263
13
Hatch v. Davis, 24 Ut. App. 378, 102 P.3d 744
9
Hidden Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills, 590 P.2d 1244, 1248 (Utah 1979)
11
Leigh Furniture v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982)
15, 16, 17, 18, 19
National Assoc. Professional Basketball Leagues v. Very Minor Leagues, 223 F.3d 1143 (10th
Cir. 2000)
16
Saltsrom v. Starke, 670 P.2d 809, (Co. Ct. App.1983)
12
17, 18
Searl v. Johnson, 646 P.2d 682 (Utah 1982)
St. Benedict's Development Company v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1994).... 16,
18,19
Winters v. Schulman, 977 P.2d 1218, 1224 (Utah Ct. App 1999)
10
Statutes
Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2
Utah Code Ann. §78-2- 2(3)0)
Utah Code Annotated §§78-40-1 and 2
Utah Code Annotated §38-9-1(6)

9, 10
1
6, 10
6

Other Authorities
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767 comment c
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 682 cmt. a
Rules
Rule 56(f)
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)

16
8
3
1

a

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2- 2(3)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Whether the trial court incorrectly concluded appellants' that the lis pendens
filed by defendant cannot form the basis of an abuse of process claim as a matter of law.
(Issue preserved at R. at 439-440, R. at 384-392, and R. at 252-270.) The trial court's
conclusion is reviewed for correctness since it was reached on cross motions for
summary judgment. Arnold Indus., Inc., v. Love, 2002 UT 133, f 11, 63 P.3d 721.
2. Was the trial court wrong in concluding that the affidavit testimony of Richard
Vincent failed to establish an ulterior motive or a willful act not proper in the regular
course of proceedings? (Issue preserved at R. at 439-440, R. at 384-392, and R. at 252270.) The trial court's factual findings are reviewed under the "clearly erroneous"
standard. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a).
3. Did the trial court err in concluding that testimony from a lender or title
company on the impact of the lis pendens was necessary to appellant's abuse of process
claim?(Issue preserved R. at 439-440, R. at 384-392, and R. at 252-270.) The trial
court's summary judgment rulings are reviewed for correctness. Arnold Indus., Inc., v.
Love, 2002 UT 133, \\ 1, 63 P.3d 721.
4. Did the trial court incorrectly conclude that the underlying lawsuit and lis
pendens cannot form the basis of a tortious interference claim because both are privileged
as a matter of law? (Issue preserved at R. at 439-440, R. at 384-392, and R. at 252-270.)
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The trial court's summary judgment rulings are reviewed for correctness. Arnold Indus,
Inc., v. Love, 2002 UT 133, \\ 1, 63 P.3d 721.
5. Was the trial court wrong in concluding the facts appellant offered in supoort of
its interference claim are insufficient as a matter of law. (Issue preserved R. at 439-440,
R. at 384-392, and R. at 252-270.) The trial court's conclusions that the facts failed to
meet the legal standard is reviewed for correctness. Drake v. Industrial Commission of
Utah, 939 P.2d 177 (UT 1997).
6. Did the trial court err when it used Mountain West's failure to meet discovery
deadlines as a basis for granting HCU's summary judgment motion? (Issue preserved R.
at 439-440, R. at 384-392, and R. at 252-270.) The trial court's summary judgment
rulings are reviewed for correctness. Arnold Indus., Inc., v Love, 2002 UT 133, ^[11, 63
P.3d721.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from an order granting appellee's Motion for Summary
Judgment and denying the Motion for Summary Judgment of plaintiffs and appellants
Mountain West Surgical Center LLC and Mountainwest Medical Properties LLC.
II. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
On January 7, 2004, Mountain West Surgical Center and Mountainwest Medical
Properties, LLC, (sometimes collectively referred to as "Mountain West" and other times
individually referred to as "Mountain West Surgical" and "Mountainwest Properties")
filed this lawsuit against Hospital Corporation of Utah, dba Lakeview Hospital ("HCU").
2

(R. at 1-7.) HCU responded by filing a Motion to Dismiss on March 24, 2004. (R. at 1113.) The trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss by order dated June 11, 2004 (R. 5455.) HCU then filed a Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order with this
Court. (R. at 56-174.) By order dated July 19, 2004, the Utah Court of Appeals denied
the petition (R. at 182-184.) After Mountain West filed an Amended Complaint on
August 3, 2004, HCU filed an answer to the Amended Complaint on August 20, 2004.
(R. at 185-194 and 195-205.)
HCU filed a motion for summary judgment on Mountain West's abuse of process,
anti-trust1 and intentional interference with economic relations claims (R. at 249-251.)
Mountain West opposed that motion and filed its own motion for partial summary
judgment, seeking partial summary judgment on the abuse of process claim (R. at 252308, 439-440.) Mountain West's motion was supported in part by the affidavits of
Richard Vincent and George Bennett. (R. at 407-438 and 413-416.) HCU opposed
Mountain West's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, moved to strike the Affidavit of
Richard Vincent (R. at 462-482, 488-493) and filed a motion for Rule 56(f) relief. (R. at
479-480.) In conjunction with these motions, Mountain West also moved to amend the
scheduling order to allow additional time to conduct limited discovery. (R. at 444-445.)
Following a hearing, the trial court granted HCU's Motion for Summary
Judgment, denied Mountain West's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, denied
Mountain West's Motion to Amend Scheduling Order and denied HCU's Motion to

1

Mountain West voluntarily dismissed their anti-trust claim. (R. at 450-451 and 460461.)
3

Strike the Affidavit of Richard Vincent. (R. at 338-339.) A copy of the Court's Order is
included in the Addendum as Tab A2. Mountain West timely filed a notice of appeal. (R.
at 519-520.)
III. Statement of Facts
In 1999, Mountainwest Properties organized a joint venture with Mountain West
Surgical and South Davis Community Hospital O'SDCH") for the construction and
operation of a 47,000 square foot medical office building (wtthe Medical Center'') on
property owned by SDCH adjacent to Lakeview Hospital. (R. at. 408.) The parties
planned to lease 6,000 of the planned 47,000 square feet to Mountain West Surgical for a
surgical center (the "Surgical Center"). (R. at 408.) The remaining space in the Medical
Center was to be leased as office space to doctors who were members of Mountainwest
Properties. (R. at 408.)
Under the planned joint venture, SDCH was to contribute a portion of its property
to Mountainwest Properties in exchange for a membership interest in the company. (R. at
383 and 408.)

SDCH did not have, and was never going to have, a membership interest

in Mountain West Surgical. (R. at 383 and R. at 408.)
Throughout 1999, Mountainwest Properties worked towards the construction of
the Medical Center. (R. at 383 and R. at 408.) It obtained building approval from
Bountiful City to construct the Medical Center, paid architects and engineers hundreds of

2

The trial court's record transferred to the Supreme Court did not include a copy of the
final Order. Through separate motion, the parties are jointly moving the Court to
supplement the Record to include the Order. A copy of the order is attached in the
Addendum as Tab A.
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thousands of dollars to prepare final plans and specifications, and received commitments
for construction financing and long term financing for the Medical Center. (R. at 383 and
R. at 409.) At the same time, HCU actively opposed construction of the Medical Center.
(R. at 383 and R. at 409.) For example, it openly opposed Mountainwest Properties'
efforts to obtain development approval from Bountiful City. (R. at 383 and R. at 409.)
When Mountainwest Properties obtained development approvals despite HCU's
administrative efforts, HCU turned to the courts and filed a complaint against SDCH on
January 10, 2000 (the w;Lawsuit"). (R. at 384.) HCU alleged four separate causes of
action against SDCH: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith
and Fair Dealing; (3) Breach of Restrictive Covenant on the Use of Land; and (4)
Declaratory Judgment. (R. at 384.) None of HCU's claims related to the type of
structure that could be built on SDCH's property. (R. at 384.) In addition, none of the
claims related to title or right to possession of the property. Rather, all claims related in
one way or another to an alleged restriction on the activities that could take place in that
structure. (R. at 384.)
By March of 2000, Mountainwest Properties had obtained a final commitment
from its construction lender, and intended to begin construction on the Medical Center
during the first week of March. (R. at 384 and R. at 409.) SDCH was prepared to
convey the property into Mountainwest Properties and construction was about to begin on
the Medical Center when HCU filed a document entitled "Notice of Lis Pendens" in the
office of the Davis County Recorder on March 2, 2000 (the "Lis Pendens'^). (R. at 504508) (A copy is of the Lis Pendens is included in the Addendum as Tab B.) The Lis
5

Pendens was recorded in spite of the fact that HCU had no claims impacting title or right
to possession of the property. The Lis Pendens was discovered by Mountainwest
Properties when its lender pulled a final title report as it was preparing to fund
Mountainwest Properties' construction financing. (R. at 384 and R. at 409.)
It soon became clear that HCU would continue its efforts to interfere with
construction of the Medical Center. Following the filing of the Lawsuit and recording of
the Lis Pendens, Richard Vincent, a board member of Mountainwest Medical and
Mountain West Surgical had a conversation with Lynn Summerhays, a member of
Lakeview Hospital's board. (R. at 385-386 and R. at 410.) Mr. Summerhays informed
Mr. Vincent that the Lawsuit and Lis Pendens were just the first in a series of actions that
HCU intended to take to stop construction of the Medical Center. He told Mr. Vincent
that HCU would do whatever was necessary tie up the process and delay construction of
the Medical Center at the SDCH location. (R. at 385-386 and R. at 410.) A copy of the
Affidavit of PLichard Vincent is included in the Addendum as Tab C.
On June 28, 2001, the Court in the underlying Lawsuit dismissed three of HCU's
four claims on summary judgment. (R. at 386.) It also ruled that the Lis Pendens was a
wrongful lien pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §38-9-1(6). Specifically, the Court
found that the Lis Pendens was a wrongful lien because it was not authorized by statute.
The plain wording of Utah Code Annotated §§78-40-1 and 2 requires that the
action has to affect title to and /or the right to possession of land. HCU has not
alleged any right to title to any of the parcels described in their lis pendens.
Neither has HCU alleged any right to possession of these said parcels.
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(R. at 394-404.) A copy of Judge Allphin's Ruling is included in the Addendum as Tab
oL After the joint venture deteriorated, HCU settled the remaining claim in the lawsuit
by paying SDCH an undisclosed sum.
The Lawsuit and notice of Lis Pendens served their purpose, and effectively
stopped the project. The lender withdrew its commitment for construction financing and
SDCH withdrew from the joint venture and did not convey the property to Mountainwest
Properties. (R. at 384 and R. at 409.) Mountainwest Properties ultimately built the
Medical Center at an alternate location after substantial delays and after incurring
significant additional costs.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE LIS
PENDENS FILED BY HCU CANNOT FORM THE BASIS FOR AN ABUSE OF
PROCESS CLAIM AS A MATTER OF LAW.
The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment regarding Mountain West's
abuse of process claim. Mountain West argued that HCU's filing of the lis pendens was
an abuse of process of as a matter of law. HCU argued that Mountain West could not
factually prove the elements of an abuse process claim. After oral argument, the trial
court concluded that the Lis Pendens cannot form the basis of an abuse of process claim,
granted HCU's motion and denied Mountain West's motion.

7

A, Factual Basis for Mountain West's Abuse of Process Claim
The material facts before the trial court were largely undisputed. Two months
after HCU filed the Lawsuit, Mountainwest Properties had obtained a final commitment
from its construction lender, SDCH was prepared to convey its property to the joint
venture and Mountainwest Properteies and was prepared to begin construction. Then
HCU filed a Lis Pendens that it admits was not supported by a claim to title or
possession. The Lis Pendens effectively stopped everything. The lender discovered the
Lis Pendens and withdrew its commitment for construction financing and SDCH
withdrew its commitment to convey the property.
Any remaining hope was killed when Lynn Summerhays, a member of Lakeview
Hospital's board told Richard Vincent that the Lawsuit and Lis Pendens were just the first
in a series of actions that HCU intended to take to stop construction of the Medical
Center. Mr. Summerhays stated that HCU would do whatever was necessary tie up the
process and delay construction of the Medical Center at the SDCH location.
B. Argument
In Anderson Development Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, 116 P. 3d 323, this Court
explained that to establish a claim for abuse of process,
a claimant must demonstrate first, an ulterior motive [and] second, an act in
the use of the process not proper in the regular prosecution of the
proceedings. Unlike a plaintiff asserting a claim for wrongful use of civil
proceedings, a plaintiff in an abuse of process claim is not required to
establish that the prior proceeding terminated in his favor or that the
proceeding lacked probable cause.
Id. at f 37 (emphasis added).
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In other words, abuse of process wiis not the wrongful procurement of legal process
or the wrongful initiation of criminal or civil proceedings; it is the misuse of process, no
matter how properly obtained, for any purpose other than that which it was designed to
accomplish." Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 682 cmt. a.
Based on the undisputed facts in the record, this Court must concluded that the
recording of the Lis Pendens violated the two part test found in Anderson Development.
1. Improper Use of Process
In Hatch v. Davis, 24 Ut. App. 378, 102 P.3d 744 the Utah Court of Appeals
explained that to establish an improper use of the process, a litigant must establish:
[sjome act or threat directed to an immediate objective not legitimate in the use of
the process; In re Terracor, No. 81-00599, 1982 Bankr.LEXIS 3251, at 19
(Bankr.N.D. Utah Sept. 27, 1982)(noting that the test for abuse of process is "that
there must be 4a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular
conduct of the proceeding' or 'some definite act not authorized by the
process'") (quoting William Prosser, Law of Torts, § 121, at 857-858).
Id at \ 14. (emphasis added)
It is undisputed that HCU's use of the Lis Pendens was not proper in the regular
prosecution of a proceeding, and that the Lis Pendens was not authorized by the process
in the underlying Lawsuit. This conclusion is supported by the plain language of Utah
Code Ann. § 78-40-2, Utah case law, the language of the Lis Pendens itself, and Judge
Allphin's ruling.
Utah law is clear that the filing of a lis pendens is a legal process that is only
proper in certain circumstances. Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2 provides:
In any action affecting the title to, or the right to possession of real
property, the plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint or thereafter, and
9

the defendant at the time of filing his answer when affirmative relief is
claimed in such answer, or at any time afterward, may file for record with
the recorder of the county in which the property or some part thereof is
situated a notice of the pendancy of the action...
Simply put, a party may only encumber another's property with a lis pendens if it has
filed claims in a lawsuit that impact title to, or right to possession of, real property. In
fact, the Utah Court of Appeals has held that if an attorney records a lis pendens, when
the underlying claims do not impact title or right to possession, that lis pendens is
groundless as a matter of law. Winters v. Schulman, 977 P.2d 1218, 1224 (Utah Ct. App
1999).
HCU's claims in the Lawsuit had no bearing on the title to, or possession of,
SDCH's property. Rather, all of HCU's claims related to alleged restrictions on the type
of business that could be conducted within the Medical Center. Under those
circumstances, HCU violated section 78-40-2 when it recorded the Lis Pendens.
The text of the Lis Pendens confirms that HCU intended to misuse the process.
Obviously aware of the requirements of section 78-40-2, HCU did not even claim a right
to title or possession.

Instead, it filed a Lis Pendens that read:

To whom it may concern, please take notice: Hospital Corporation of Utah,
dba Lakeview Hospital ("Lakeview"), the above-named plaintiff, has a
pending Complaint against the above-named defendant South Davis
Community Hospital, Inc. ("South Davis") in the above-entitled Court for
injunctive relief against South Davis' proposed use of certain real property
owned by South Davis...
(R. at 504-507.)
On its face, the Lis Pendens is not even an attempt to comply with section

10

78-40-2. Therefore, there can be no reasonable argument that the Lis Pendens was filed
for its proper purpose: to notify third parties that a claim existed affecting title to or
possession of the property. By statute, any other purpose is improper.
Finally, the conclusion that the Lis Pendens was a misuse of the process is
confirmed by Judge Allphin's Ruling. As he explained, "[t]he plain wording of Utah
Code Annotated §§78-40-1 and 2 requires that the action has to affect title to and/or the
right to possession of land. HCU has not alleged any right to title to any of the parcels
described in their lis pendens. Neither has HCU alleged any right to possession of these
said parcels." Furthermore, "even if HCU had a legitimate property interest, it failed to
adequately describe in its Complaint both this interest and the particular parcels for which
it had such an interest. Therefore, the Court finds that HCU's Notice of Lis Pendens was
improperly filed and thus is a wrongful lien." (R. at 403.)
2. Ulterior Motive
There can be no reasonable dispute regarding HCU's motive in filing the Lis
Pendens. This Court has consistently held that "the sole purpose of recording a lis
pendens is to give constructive notice of the pendency of proceedings which may be
derogatory to an owner's title or right to possession." Hidden Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills,
590 P.2d 1244, 1248 (Utah 1979) (emphasis added).
It was undisputed that HCU had no claim to title or right to possession.
Therefore, it had no legitimate interest to protect by recording the Lis Pendens. If the
only proper motive for recording the Lis Pendens was not available to HCU, then its

11

decision to record the Lis Pendens must have been born of an ulterior motive. Time and
again HCU has admitted that motive: to stop construction of the project. (R at 468.)
The timing of the Lis Pendens helps illustrate HCU's ulterior motive. HCU filed
its Complaint on January 10, 2000. It did not, however, immediately record the Lis
Pendens. Rather, it waited until March 2, 2000, days before SDCH was to convey the
property to Mountainwest Properties and Mountainwest Properties was scheduled to
close on its construction financing. Combined with the statements of HCU board
member Lynn Summerhays, it is clear that the Lis Pendens was a tactical attempt to use
the process to disrupt Mountainwest Properties' financing and stop construction.
While Utah courts have not directly addressed the misuse of a lis pendens as the
basis for an abuse of process claim, this issue has been addressed by courts in other
jurisdictions. For example, in Saltsrom v. Starke, 670 P.2d 809, (Co. Ct. App. 1983) the
court held that a lis pendens filed to prevent a sale to a third party, when the filing party
knew it did not have a valid purchase contract, could serve as the basis for an abuse of
process claim. Id at 811. Similarly, the South Carolina Supreme Court in Broadmoor
Apartments of Charleston v. Horwitz, 413 S.E.2d 9, (S.C. 1992) held that by filing an
improper lis pendens, there was "ample evidence from which a jury could infer
that.. .Horwitz willfully abused the process, with the ulterior purpose of preventing a sale
to third parties in hopes of obtaining financial backing with which to purchase the
property at an advantageous price."
Based on the foregoing, Mountain West established the ulterior motive
component.
12

II. THE TRIAL ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE UNDISPUTED
EVIDENCE IN FAILED TO ESTABLISH AN ULTERIOR MOTIVE OR A
WILLFUL ACT.
The evidence before the trail court regarding HCU's ulterior motive was
undisputed. HCU admitted that it had no claim that impacted title or right to possession,
and that it recorded a Lis Pendens anyway. (R at 466.) HCU admitted that it motive was
to stop construction of the project, a goal it could not accomplish through its claims in the
lawsuit. HCU's board member, Lynn Summerhays, stated that the Lawsuit and Lis
Pendens were just the first in a series of actions that HCU intended to take to stop
construction of the project. (R at 410.)
On the other hand, HCU presented no evidence of any kind regarding its motive.
Consequently, the only conclusion the trial court could reach was that HCU had an
ulterior motive. This is particularly true, in light of the fact that when reviewing a trial
court's grant of a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the facts and "all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party." Hale v. Beckstead, 2005 UT, 24, Tf2, 116 P.3d 263.
Similar problems exist with the trial court's finding that Mountain West failed to
produce evidence of a willful act not proper in the regular course of proceedings.

It is

undisputed that HCU had no claims impacting title to or right to possession. This fact
was confirmed by the court in the underlying Lawsuit when it deemed the Lis Pendens a
wrongful lien. (R at 403.) There has never been an argument regarding the willfulness of
HCU's actions. Consequently, the only competent evidence before the trial court was
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that HCU willfully recorded a lis pendens that was not proper in the regular course of a
proceeding.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT TESTIMONY
FROM A LENDER OR TITLE COMPANY ON THE IMPACT OF THE LIS
PENDENS WAS NECESSARY.
On a related issue the trial court found that "Plaintiffs offer no testimony from any
lender or title company that the lis pendens, as such, caused them to refuse to proceed
with the sale of the underlying land." (See Addendum, Tab A.) This finding is troubling
for three reasons. First, it misstates the nature of the transaction; second, it implies that
testimony from a lender or title company is necessary to support Mountain West's
claims; third, it ignores the undisputed testimony from Richard Vincent and George
Bennet that confirmed this fact.
Mountain West established through the affidavit of Richard Vincent that "the lis
pendens was discovered by Mountainwest Properties when its lender pulled a final title
report as it was preparing to fund Mountainwest Properties' construction financing. The
notice of lis pendens effectively stopped the project. SDCH did not deed the property to
Mountainwest Properties and Mountainwest Properties' lender withdrew its commitment
for construction financing." (R. at 409) This testimony was confirmed by the testimony
of George Bennett, president of SDCH. (R. at 416.) HCU did not dispute this testimony,
and the trial court denied its motion to strike the testimony.
Based on the foregoing, there was competent, undisputed evidence that the lis
pendens disrupted Mountainwest Property's construction financing. Any conclusion to
the contrary is not supported by the record, and the trial court erred in its findings.
14

IV. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE
UNDERLYING LAWSUIT AND LIS PENDENS CANNOT FORM THE BASIS
OF A TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE CLAIM AS A MATTER OF LAW
BECAUSE BOTH ARE PROTECTED BY THE JUDICIAL PROCEEDING
PRIVILEGE.
The trial court concluded that the filing of the Lawsuit and Lis Pendens were
privileged as a matter of law and therefore could not form the basis of a tortious
interference claim. (See Order attached in the Addendum as Tab A.) HCU first made
this argument in a motion to dismiss that was denied by the trial court. HCU then
petitioned this Court for permission to file an interlocutory appeal on this issue. That
petition was denied. (R. at 182-184.) HCU's motion for summary judgment was its third
attempt to argue this issue. (R. at 249-251.) Its rationale for revisiting this issue a third
time was its claim that the law in Utah been clarified by the Court's decision in Anderson
Development Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, 116 P. 3d 323.
The claim is wrong. Utah courts have consistently held that baseless and
unfounded litigation can serve as the basis for an interference with economic
relationships claim.
The seminal Utah case addressing the tort of interference with economic relations
is Leigh Furniture v. Isorn, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982). Much like this case, Leigh
Furniture is a case based on the filing of groundless lawsuits. In that case, Isom brought
a counterclaim against the Leigh Corporation for intentional interference with contractual
relations based on, among other things, groundless lawsuits filed by the Leigh
Corporation. While setting forth the elements of a tortious interference claim, this Court
explained that ^'unfounded litigation" satisfies the improper means component of a
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tortious interference claim. Id. at 308-09. In the process, the Supreme Court specifically
addressed the judicial proceedings privilege and first amendment concerns.
In St. Benedict's Development Company v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194
(Utah 1994), the Court confirmed that "unfounded litigation" can serve as improper
means. Id at 201. Since then, the Court has never indicated any intention to limit its
holdings in Leigh Furniture and St. Benedict's Development in the manner advocated by
HCU.
Furthermore, the Leigh Furniture and St. Benedict's Development decisions are
consistent with the great weight of authority on this issue. The Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 767 comment c, for example, states:
Litigation and the threat of litigation are powerful weapons. When
wrongfully instituted, litigation entails harmful consequences to... the
actor's adversaries. The use of these weapons.. .is ordinarily wrongful if
the actor has no belief in the merit of the litigation or if, though having
some belief in its merits, he nevertheless institutes or threatens to institute
the action in bad faith, intending only to harass the third parties and not to
bring his claim to definitive adjudication.
Applying § 767, the court in National Assoc. Professional Basketball Leagues v. Very
Minor Leagues, 223 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2000), explained that wrongful litigation can
serve as the basis for a tortious interference claim. Authority from other jurisdictions is
in accord.3

3

See Silver v. Mendel, 894 F.2d 598 (3rd. Cir. 1990); Trau-Med v. Allstate Ins., 71
S.W.3d 691 (Tenn. 2002); Guard-Life v. S. Parker Hardware, 406 N.E.2d 445 (N.Y.
1980); Corning Inc. v. SRUBiosystems, 292 F.Supp. 2d 583 (D. Del. 2003); Cacique,
Inc. v. Gonzalez,WL 609278 (N.D. 111. 2004); Mantia v. Hanson, 79 P.3d 404 (Or. Ct.
App. 2003); Matsushita Electronics Corp. v. Loral Co., 91A F.Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y.
1997); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co,, 797 F.2d 70 (2d. Cir. 1986).
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In the face of well settled Utah law, HCU relied on the decision in Anderson
Development to support is argument that the underlying Lawsuit and Lis Pendens cannot
form the basis for a tortious interference claim, and are privileged as a matter of law.
While the trial court agreed with HCU's position, a careful review of the holding in
Anderson Development establishes that it is not controlling on this case.
Unlike the claims in this case, the tort claims in Anderson Development were not
based on the filing of a lawsuit. Instead, they were based on statements made by Tobias
during a public hearing in which he opposed Anderson Development's zoning
application. In addressing whether those statements could satisfy the improper means
component of an interference claim, the Court acknowledged, as it did in Leigh
Furniture, that certain speech is protected by the First Amendment. Relying on Searle v.
Johnson, the Court explained that the First Amendment protects "political activity against
tort claims as well as antitrust claims". Anderson Development at 332, citing Searle v.
Johnson, 646 P.2d 682 (Utah 1982). The Court found that because petitioning the city
constituted political activity, Tobias's statements were protected by the First Amendment.
Nowhere in the opinion, however, does the Court indicate that its holding impact the
numerous tort claims, including tortious interference, abuse of process and wrongful use
of civil proceedings, that can be based on the filing of lawsuits. Furthermore, nowhere in
the opinion does the Court indicate that it intends to overturn or limit Leigh Furniture and
St. Benedict Development4

4

In fact, the Court's opinion in Anderson Development relies on the holding in Sear I v.
Johnson. The rationale in Searl v. Johnson cannot be read to overturn Leigh Furniture
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In addition to its reliance on Anderson Development, HCU relied on language
from Bennett v Jones Waldo, 70 P.3d 17 (Utah 2003), to support its argument that the
Court has somehow created a blanket privilege for "use of the legal process itself." The
Court did nothing of the sort, and did not even attempt to address the long-standing Utah
law established by the Supreme Court in Leigh Furniture. Instead, the Bennett Court
simply held that statements made during prior bar order litigation could not serve as the
basis for subsequent intentional infliction of emotional distress and deceit claims. This is
consistent with the Court's previous application of the privilege to defamation claims
based on statements made in demand letters or statements made during the litigation
process.

V. THE TRIAL COURT WAS WRONG IN CONCLUDING THE FACT
APPELANTS OFFERED IN SUPPORT OF ITS INTERFERENCE CLAIM ARE
INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Mountain West contends that the Lawsuit and Lis Pendens satisfy the improper
means component of a tortious interference claim. Mountain West supported its claims
with proof that the Lawsuit and Lis Pendens were groundless. Despite the fact that
Mountain West's evidence was undisputed, the trial court ruled that Mountain West
"failed to factually demonstrate the elements of an interference claim." {See Order
included in Tab A of the Addendum.)

since the opinion in Searl v Johnson actually predates Leigh Furniture. The NoerrPenningon doctrine and the Court's ruling in Leigh Furniture have existed in harmony
since 1986.
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The law in Utah is well established that to prevail on a claim for tortious
interference, a plaintiff must demonstrate, "(I).. .the defendant intentionally interfered
with the plaintiffs existing or potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose
or by improper means, (3) causing injury to plaintiffs." Anderson Development, citing
Leigh Furniture & Carpet v. horn, 657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 1982). There was no real
dispute before the trial court regarding the first and third elements of the interference
claim. It was undisputed that HCU interfered with Mountain West's economic relations
and it was undisputed that Mountain West was injured. The only issue before the trial
court was whether HCU interfered for an improper purpose or by an improper means.
As is established above, groundless litigation satisfies the improper means
component of an interference claim. See Leigh Furniture v. horn and St. Benedict's
Development. Therefore, to defeat summary judgment, Mountain West was only
required to raise issues of fact regarding the validity of the underlying Lawsuit.
In the underlying Lawsuit, HCU sought relief based on four separate causes of
action against SDCH; (1) Breach of Contract, (2) Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith
and Fair Dealing; (3) Breach of Restrictive Covenant on the Use of Land, and (4)
Declaratory Judgment (the "Lawsuit"). The first, second and fourth claims were
dismissed in the underlying lawsuit by the trial court on summary judgment. The
restrictive covenant claim survived based on perceived questions of fact.
In this case, Mountain West conclusively addressed those perceived issues of fact,
and established that the restrictive covenant claim was groundless as well. HCU claimed
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a restrictive covenant prevented SDCH (and Mountainwest Properties) from constructing
the Medical Center. By its terms, however, the restrictive covenant was limited to a
prohibition on the establishment of a commercial ancillary facility. A
commercial ancillary facility is defined as including, but not limited to,
commercial laboratories or x-ray, radiological imaging, physical therapy,
pulmonary or cardiology testing or out-patient medical facilities or birthing
centers, any of which are offered on a commercial basis to third-party users.
This prohibition shall not restrict physicians on the land from maintaining
or performing ancillary services for their own patients. This prohibition
shall be a covenant running with the land and enforceable so long as
Hospital Corporation of Utah or any other subsidiary of Healthtrust, Incthe hospital company continues to operate an acute care hospital adjacent to
the property.
(R. at 385.)
Through the affidavit testimony of Richard Vincent and Gordon Bennett (the CEO
of SDCH), Mountain West established that the planned Medical Center would not have
been a "commercial ancillary facility" as defined by the restrictive covenant. (R. at 409410.) Rather, the Medical Center was simply a 47,000 square foot medical office
complex. Mountainwest Properties never intended to operate any facilities on the
Medical Center. Instead, it intended to lease space to tenants. Likewise, the Surgical
Center that Mountain West Surgical intended to open in leased space within the Medical
Center would not have been a "commercial ancillary facility" as defined by the restrictive
covenant. Mountain West Surgical did not intend to allow any of its member doctors to
provide the prohibited services on a commercial basis to uthird-party users." The
member doctors could only perform services on their own patients. (R. at 409-410.)
These were the only facts before the trial court on summary judgment, and they
were not disputed. At a bare minimum, Mountain West created issues of fact precluding
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summary judgment. Under no circumstances, however, did it fail to present evidence to
support the elements of its interference claim.
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT USED MOUNTAIN WEST'S
FAILURE TO MEET DISCOVERY DEADLINES AS A BASIS FOR GRANTING
HCU'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION.
In addition to summary judgment motions, there were several other issues before
the trial court at the January 20, 2006 hearing. The Court also considered Mountain
West's Motion to Amend the Scheduling Order (R. at 444-445), HCU's Motion to Strike
the Affidavit of Richard Vincent (R. at 338) and HCU's Rule 56(f) motion (R. at 479480). The heart of these motions was HCU's contention that Mountain West failed to
comply with the scheduling order. Through Mountain West's motion to amend, and
HCU's Rule 56(f) motion, the parties both asked the trial court for addition time to
conduct limited discovery. As an alternative, HCU asked the trial court to punish
Mountain West for alleged violation of the scheduling order by striking the Affidavit of
Richard Vincent. HCU did not ask the Court, however, to use the discovery dispute as a
basis to grant or deny summary judgment.
The trial court denied Mountain West's motion to amend and denied HCU's
motion to strike the affidavit of Richard Vincent. It did not rule on HCU's rule 56(f)
motion, which was essentially rendered moot by its decision on HCU's motion for
summary judgment. (See Order included in Tab A of the Addendum.) It did not strike any
of the pleadings.
On its own initiative, the trial court used the scheduling dispute as a basis to
decide the summary judgment motions. Despite the fact that HCU never asked it to do
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so, the trial court ruled that, uAs an additional basis for the Court's decision on
Defendant's Motion is Plaintiffs failure to comply with the agreed schedule on the
Attorney's Planning Meeting Report filed herein." (See Addendum, Tab A.) The trial
court did not identify which of defendant's motions it was referring to, and did not
identify the rationale for its decision.
Assuming the trial court was referring to defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment, there are two glaring problems with the trial court's ruling. First, any
perceived violations of the scheduling order did not impact the facts or issues before the
trial court on summary judgment. Second, even if the Mountain West failed to comply
with the discovery order, Utah law does not allow the trial court to use that failure as a
basis to grant HCU's Motion for Summary Judgment.
A. Discovery issues had no bearing on the facts or issues before the court.
The trial court found that Mountain West failed to file Rule 26 disclosures, failed
to timely respond to discovery and did not file expert reports. (See Order included in Tab
A of the Addendum.) Even if the trial court was correct, none of these acts had any
bearing on the issues before the trial court. Mountain West ultimately responded to
written discovery, and included all of the information typically contained in Rule 26
disclosures. While the discovery responses were admittedly late, the trial court never
granted a motion to compel or had to address any issues relating to discovery in this case.
The trial court's reference to expert reports is also troubling. Mountain West's
abuse of process and tortuous interference claims do not rely on expert testimony.
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Consequently, it is irrelevant whether Mountain West designated expert witnesses by the
deadline contained it the scheduling order.
Simply put, the alleged violation of the scheduling order should have had no
bearing on the legal or factual issues before the trial court.
B. There is no legal basis for the trial court's decision.
There was no pattern of discovery abuse in this case. The trial court never
considered a motion to compel, and prior to its final order, never entered any ruling
regarding discovery. Those facts highlight the egregious nature of the trial court's
decision.
There is also no precedent for the trial court's decision. While this Court has
upheld a trial court's decision to strike pleadings when a party repeatedly violates orders
compelling discovery, Mountain West is not aware of single case where a Utah Appellate
court has upheld (or even addressed) a trial court's decision to grant summary judgment
based on alleged failures to timely comply with a scheduling order. This fact was readily
acknowledged by the by the trial court at the hearing. (R. at 530, page 57 lines 4-14.)
Because it lacked any legal basis for its actions, the trial court's decision must be
overturned.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Mountain West respectfully requests that this Court (1)
vacate the trial court's decisions on summary judgment, enter summary judgment for
Mountain West on its abuse of process claim and remand the case to the trial court for a
determination regarding the amount of damages suffered by Mountain West; or in the
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alternative, Mountain West requests that the Court vacate the trial court's summary
judgment ruling on the abuse of process claim and remand the case to the trial court for a
trial on the merits; and (2) Mountain West requests that the Court vacate the trial court's
summary judgment ruling on the tortious interference claim and remand the case to the
trial court for a trial on the merits .
DATED this 28th day of July, 2006.

DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN

Craig Q/Adrfmson
Craig A. Hog^anDebra G. Griffiths
Attorneys for Appellants
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U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of APPELLANT'S BRIEF to the
following:
Andrew H. Stone
Marci B. Rechtenbach
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Tab A

Andrew H. Stone (USB # 4921)
Marci B. Rechtenbach (USB #8146)
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH PC
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)521-3200
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Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MOUNTAIN WEST SURGICAL CENTER, : ORDER
L.L.C. and MOUNTAINWEST MEDICAL
PROPERTIES, L.L.C.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF UTAH, dba
LAKEVIEW HOSPITAL, a Utah Corporation,

Civil No. 040600019 MI
Judge Thomas L. Kay

Defendant.
This case come on before the Court on January 20,2006 on Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Defendant's Motion to
Strike Affidavit ofRichard Vincent and Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Scheduling Order. The
Court, have reviewed the memoranda and affidavits filed by the parties, and having considered
the arguments of counsel, makes the following ruling:
1.

The Court HEREBY GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on

all counts;
2.

With respect to Plaintiffs' interference claim, the Court rules that as a matter of

law neither the underlying lawsuit in the matter of Hospital Corporation of Utah v. South Davis

728499v2

Community Hospital, Case 000700012 (2nd D. Court, Judge Allphin) or the lis pendens filed by
Defendant herein in connection with that other action can form the basis for an interference
action for the reasons stated in Defendant's brief. Plaintiffs have failed to factually demonstrate
the elements of an interference claim and the conduct alleged to constitute an interference is
privileged as a matter of law;
3.

On Plaintiffs' claim for abuse of process, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed

to produce evidence of an ulterior motive on the part of Defendant or a willful act not proper in the
regular course proceedings that caused Plaintiffs' harm. The Court rules that as a matter of law that the
lis pendens filed by Defendant herein in connection with that other action cannot form the basis for an
abuse of process claim for the reasons stated in Defendant's brief. In addition, Plaintiffs offer no
testimony from any lender or title company that the lis pendens, as such, caused them to refuse to
proceed with the sale of the underlying land;
4.

In short, Plaintiffs have not come forth with evidence to create any disputed issue of fact

and Defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law;
5.

An additional basis for the Court's decision on Defendant's Motion is Plaintiffs failure

to comply with the agreed schedule on the Attorneys' Planning Meeting Report filed herein. This
includes the failure of the Plaintiffs to file Rule 26 Disclosures, to respond to discovery during the
factual discovery period, and file expert reports on the appointed date;
6.

As to Defendants' Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Richard Vincent, the Court DENIES

this motion and this Court has granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment notwithstanding such
affidavit;
7?R499v2
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7.

As to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the Court DENIES that motion

for the reasons stated above for the Court's granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, The
Court rules that as a matter of law that the lis pendens filed by Defendant herein in connection with that
other action cannot form the basis for an abuse of process claim for the reasons stated in Defendant's
brief; and
8.

As to the Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Scheduling Order, the Court DENIES that motion

as set forth above on its ruling for Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
DATED this

<

b ^ d k y of February, 2006.
BY THE COURT

Judge Thomas Ly
Second District <

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN

Cranio. Adamson
Crdfg A. Hoggan
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on c/

day of February, 2006,1 caused one true and correct copy of the

foregoing to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
Craig G. Adamson
Craig A. Hoggan
Dart, Adamson & Donovan
370 East South Temple, Suite 400'
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, FARM1NGTON DEPARTMENT

HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF UTAH, dba
LAKEVIEW HOSPITAL, a Utah corporation,
NOTICE OF US PENDENS
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 000700012

SOUTH DAVIS COMMUNITY HOSPITAL,
INC., a Utah Corporation,

Judge Allphin

Defendant.

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN, PLEASE TAKE NOTICE:
Hospital Corporation of Utah, dba Lakeview Hospital ("Lakeview"), the above-named
plaintiff, has a pending Complaint against the above-named defendant South Davis Community
Hospital, Inc. ("South Davis") in the above-entiled Court for injunctive relief against South
Davis's proposed use o\" certain real property owned by South Davis, which is located in
437847vl
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Bountiful, Utah, and is more particularly described as the following described tracts of land in
Davis County, State of Utah:
PARCEL 1:
Beginning on the North line of Section 29 and a Westerly deed segment of the
Hospital Corporation at point North 89°38'33" East 302.48 feet along the
section line from the Northwest corner of Section 29, Township 2 North, Range
1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, Bountiful, Utah; and running thence
North 0°12'10" West 170.00 feet, thence North 89°38'33" East 2.28 feet to a
point in a Southerly fence line in connection with the Barton Creek drainage
channel, and a point on a 75 foot radius curve to the right (radius bears South
17°17'50" West); thence Southeasterly along said curve and fence line 29.06
feet (central angle = 22°12'08" and next point is non-tangent); thence South
52°36' East 8.87 feet to a point on a 98 foot radius curve to the right (radius
bears South 38°01'40" West); thence Southeasterly along said curve for an arc
distance of 19.70 feet feet (central angle = ll°31'08" and next point is nontangent), thence South 42°54'13"East 19.87 feet, thence South 53°31'02" East
8.44 feet, thence South 49°42' East 17.47 feet, thence South 54°33'48" East
17.75 feet; thence South 52°06'24" East 56.36 feet, thence North 41°21'30"
East 5.05 feet, thence South 55°44'56" East 15.77 feet to a point on a 66.6 foot
radius curve to the right (radius bears South 31 °34'13" West) thence
Southeasterly along said curve for an arc distance of of 37.51 feet (central angle
= 32° 15'54" and next point is non-tangent), thence South 20° 19'46" East 4.44
feet; thence North 89°40'49" West 51.47 feet, thence South 10°15'50" West
24.69 feet to said section line, thence South 89°38'33" West 127.82 feet along
the section line to point of beginning.
Parcel #04-003-0-10^ Orjaq
PARCEL 2;
Beginning on North line of 5Ul South Street 258.92 feet East line of 4* East
Street at a point 359.88 feet East and 483.86 feet South 0°07' West of relocated
NW corner of Section 29, Township 2 North, Range 1 East Salt Lake Meridian;
thence North 0°07' East 236.5 feet; thence East 110 feet; thence South 0°7'

-U7847V1
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West 236.5 feet to North line of 5th South Street; thence West 100 feet to the
point of beginning. Cont. 0.595 acres.
Parcel #04-069-0004.
PARCEL 3:
Beginning on North side of 5th South Street 368.92 feet East of East line of 4Ul
East Street, which point is 469.88 feet East and 438.86 feet South 0°07' West
of relocated monument at NW corner Section 29 Township 2 North, Range 1
East; Salt Lake Meridian; North 0°07' East 236.5 feet East 84.5 feet South
0°07' West 236.5 feet to North line side of 5th South Street, thence West along
side of North line 84.5 feet to beginning. Cont. 0.46 acres.
Parcel #65-069-0005.
PARCEL 4:
Beginning at a point on the North line of 500 South Street (a 66 foot wide road)
which point is North 89°38'33" East 100.96 feet along the Section line and
South 0° 11 '23" East 483.76 feet along the East line of 400 East Street (a 66
foot wide road) and North 89°44'04" East 258.92 feet along said North line of
500 South Street from the Northwest corner of Section 29, Township 2 North,
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, said point of beginning being also
North 89°44'04" East 291.92 feet along the centerline of said 500 South Street
and North 0°11'23" West 33.00 feet from an existing brass monument at the
centerline intersection of said 400 East Street and said 500 South Street and
running thence North 0°H'23" West 236.50 feet along an existing fence line;
thence North 89°44'04" East 26.08 feet; thence North 0°11'23" West 117.47
feet along a line which is 10 feet east of an existing hospital building; thence
North 89°38'33" East 135.02 feet; thence along an existing fence on the West
boundary of the Barton Creek Canal in the following two courses: Southeasterly
56.49 feet along the arc of a 330.00 foot radius curve to the left through a
central angle of 9°48'31" (chord bears South 20°30'00" East 67.43 feet), South
20°30'00" East 67.43 feet; thence South 89°44'04" West 89.49 feet; thence
South 0°11'23" East 236.50 feet; thence South 89°44'04" West 110.00 feet
along said North line of 500 South Street to the point of beginning.
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DATED this i l _ day of March 2000
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK
& MCDONOUGH
^ n M1 --

James S. Lowne
Lewis M. Francis
Attorneys for Plaintiff
STATE OF UTAH

{

ss

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
)
On the £ ± day of March, 2000, personally appeared before me Lewis M. Francis,
t h e sign er

of the foregoing instrument, who du,y acknowledged to me that he executed the

same.
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MOTMRY P U B U C
&^p%\
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^ £ i $ -7 My Conmission Expires
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Aon! 14 2032
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STATS. ^ F UTAH

NOTARY PUBLIC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on t h e ^ ^ t i a y of March, 2000, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Lis Pendens, to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the
following:
George K. Fadel
Attorney for Defendant
170 West 400 South
Bountiful, Utah 84010
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Craig G. Adamson (0024)
Craig A. Hoggan (8202)
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN
370 East South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-6383
Facsimile: (801)355-2513
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN II I)', ShU >Ni) II ii HCIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MOUNTAIN WEST SURGICAL
CENTER, L.L.C. and
MOUNTAINWEST MED1 ..
PROPERTIES, L.L.C.,

:
:
:
:

AFF *AVTI OF RICHARD
VINCENT

Plaintiffs,
.

vs.

CIM- M

iiinmDrii

:

HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF UTAH, '.
dba LAKEVIEW HOSPITAL, a Utah
'.
Corporation,

Judge Thomas L. Kay

Defendant.
-oooOooo

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
CONN IV OF SALT LAKE )
Richard Vincent, briny, f'irsi duly sworn iindri oath, deposes and states as follows:
I I am an individual over the age of eighteen and I make the following Affidavit based
on my personal knowledge, and w<

2. In 1999 and 2000,1 was the Secretary/Treasurer of Mountain West Surgical Center
L.L.C. (Mountain West Surgical") and the Secretary/Treasurer of Mountainwest Medical
Properties L.L.C. ("Mountainwest Properties").
3. In 1999, Mountainwest Properties organized a joint venture for the construction and
operation of a 47,000 square foot medical office building to be constructed on the property of
South Davis Community Hospital which is adjacent to Lakeview Hospital ("the Medical
Center").
4. 16,000 of the 47,000 square feet was to be leased to Mountain West Surgical for the
operation of a surgical center (the "Surgical Center"). The remaining space in the Medical
Center was to be leased as office space to doctors who were members of Mountainwest
Properties.
5. Mountainwest Properties planned to construct the Medical Center on property that was
owned by South Davis Community Hospital ("SDCH").
6. SDCH was to contribute a portion of its property to Mountainwest Properties in
exchange for a membership interest in Mountain West Properties.
7. SDCH did not have, and was never going to have, a membership interest in Mountain
West Surgical.
8. Throughout 1999, Mountainwest Properties had worked towards the construction of
the Medical Center. It had obtained approval from Bountiful City to construct the Medical
Center, it had paid architects and engineers hundreds of thousands of dollars to prepare final
plans and specifications for the construction of the Medical Center and had made arrangements
and received commitments for construction financing and long term financing for the Medical
Center.
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), III 11 had actively opposed the construction of the Medical Center. For example, it

openly opposed Mountainwest Properties efforts to obtain development appn -\:<:
i Viilei" from lUtiititikil \

10. By March of 2000, Mountainwest Properties had obtained a final commitment from
its construe)inn u n<l<

fid'*')

iction on the Medical Center during the first

week of March.
11. Days before SDCH

-Properties, and

construction could begin on the Medical Center, HCU filed a notice of lis pendens in the office
of the Davis County Recorder on March 2,2000.
] ,l I I'IL Its (Kiiilcn i was discovered by Mountainwest Properties when its lender pulled a
final title report as it was preparing to fund Mountainwest Properties' construction financing.
1

the projet -

;

*< 11 did not deed the

property to Mountainwest Properties and Mountainwest Properties' lender withdrew its
commitment for construction financing.
1

irough the lawsuit and subsequent lis pendens, HCU claimed that there was a

restrictive covenant that prevented SDCH (and Mountainwest Properties) 11 m 11 • • i 11 111 u I. i. f 11 .t
Medic ni CeniH'
15. By its terms, the restrictive covenant was a:
Prohibition on the establishment of a commercial ancillary facility. A commercial
ancillary facility is defined as including but not limited to commercial laboratories or
x-ray, radiological imaging, physical therapy, pulmonary or cardiology testing or
out-patient Medical facilities or birthing centers, any of which are offered on a
commercial basis to third-party users. This prohibition shall not restrict physicians
on the land from maintaining or performing ancillary services for their own patients.
This prohibition shall be a covenant running with the land and enforceable so long as
Hospital Corporation of Utah or any other subsidiary of Healthtrust, Inc.- the hospital
company continues to operate an acute care hospital adjacent to the property
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16. The planned Medical Center would not have been a "commercial ancillary facility"
as defined by the restrictive covenant. Rather, the Medical Center was simply a 47,000 square
foot medical office complex.
17. Mountainwest Properties did not intend to operate any facilities on the Medical
Center. Instead, it intended to lease space to tenants.
18. The Surgical Center that Mountain West Surgical intended to open in leased space
within the Medical Center would not have been a "commercial ancillary facility" as defined by
the restrictive covenant. Mountain West Surgical did not intend to allow any of its member
doctors to provide the prohibited services on a commercial basis to "third-party users". The
member doctors could only perform services on their own patients.
19. Following thefilingof the lawsuit and recording of the lis pendens, it became clear
that the HCU would continue its efforts to interfere with the construction of the Medical Center.
Following thefilingof the lawsuit and recording of the lis pendens, I had a conversation with
Lynn Summerhays, a member of Lakeview Hospital's board. Mr. Summerhays informed me
that the lawsuit and lis pendens were just thefirstin a series of actions that HCU intended to take
to stop construction of the Medical Center. He told me that HCU would do whatever was
necessary tie up the process and delay construction of the Medical Center at the SDCH location.
DATED t h i s / H ^ W of October, 2005.

Richard Vincent
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SUBSCRIBED and SWORN TO before me this t^Z day of October, 2005.

ROBYN LAMBERT
NOTARY PUBLIC - STATE OF UTAH
8 EAST BROADWAY, STE 740
SALT LAKE CTTY, UT 84111
MyComm. Exp, 08/21/2006

Notary Public

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the I«•/**" day of October, 2005, I caused to be mailed a true
and correct copy of the foregon
Andrew H. Stone
Marci B. Rechtenbach
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & M
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

JGH

±

TabL)

HCGHD DISTRICT COURT

M M 28 P I: 2b
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT
HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF UTAH,
dba LAKEVIEW HOSPITAL, a Utah
Corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AND
FOR LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED
ANSWER AND COUNTER CI AIM

SOUTH DAVIS COMMUNITY
HOSPITAL mr » TTtah Corporation,

Case No. 000700012
Judge Michael i i Al'mliiii

Defendant.
INTRODUCTION
South Davis Comniuiiih llnsmlril In

'), defendant, has filed this Motion for

Summary Judgment, with a memorandum in support of the motion
ci > i I I | >iy uitli I he requirements of Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4-501 of
the Utah Code of Judicial Administr

.atement of undisputed facts in

"separate numbered sentences which specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which
!ll».' t'.!',",:'.!!! t'.'llf'K '

The Plaintiff, Hospital Corporation of Utah,
memorandum. In that memorandum HCU, unlike SDCH, included a separate statement of
undisputed facts in Nt'p.iiiiir numlvi nl ,ciih noes specifically referring to those portions of the
record upon which it relied.

As a result of having only one party follow the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, the Court made its own determination as to
what facts are in dispute and which of these facts are material for the purpose of this motion. In
so doing, the Court compared HCU's numbered statement of undisputed facts with both the
unformatted facts listed in SDCH's brief, as well as SDCH's Answer. Based on this comparison,
the Court concludes the following:
UNDISPUTED FACTS
1. Up until approximately 1973, SDCH operated a small 74 bed general acute care
hospital at the site of its current nursing home facility in Bountiful, Utah.
2. By the mid-1960's, both Davis County and SDCH recognized that its hospital facility
was neither large enough nor modern enough to meet the growing demands of southern Davis
County residents. Davis County determined that it needed two new hospitals to serve its growing
population, with one hospital in the north end of the county, and another in the south.
3. SDCH recognized that it could not remodel or enlarge the SDCH facility sufficiently to
meet the growing needs of southern Davis County, and that it did not have the resources to
construct and operate a new hospital.
4. Davis County eventually sought commercial entities to develop, finance, construct and
operate the new Davis County hospitals. After lengthy investigation and extended negotiations
with Davis County and SDCH, Hospital Corporation of America ("HCA") agreed to develop,
finance, construct and operate a new and larger hospital, now known as Lakeview Hospital, on
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the property adjoining the old SDCH hospital, As a result, on or about November 20, 1973,
SDCH and HCA entered into a written agreement ("Agreement").
5. Pursuant to the Agreement, HCA agreed to finance, develop, construct, and operate
the Lakeview Hospital, through Hospital Corpc

a subsidiary of HCA.

HCU promised to keep prices at or below the average prices for substantially simiL *
Hoh

-Day Saint hospitals for a period of four years.
6. SDCH agreed to cease operating its present tttif'tilx»i nig "M hcd general acute care

hospital at the time HCA became ready and able to commence its operation of a new, modern,
149 (approximati lyf linl ).»ni< i.il iuiilf kau' lui\fii(„il
The Agreement did not impose any other restrictions on. SD(

ilh re^.u Is (o

ipeting with i:
8. Both HCU and SDCH co

•

.

.

- .

Lakeview Hospital

and SDCH have not provided overlapping services. Lakeview Hospital has continn.
.I .i ucniM.il .i ili i i Iiii'.pn.il .il nl SIM 11 has continued operating its neighboring facility as a
nursing home.
1

1 lnl 989 Lakeview transferred deeds to SDCH in order to straighten the borders

between their adjoining

deeds were certain covenants prohibiting

the establishment of a competing commercial ancillary facility. The pertinent
nercial ancillary facility as:
including but not limited to commercial laboratories or x-ray, radiological imaging,
physical therapy, pulmonary or cardiology testing or out-patient Medical facilities
or birthing centers, any of which are offered on a commercial basis to third party
users. This prohibition shall not restrict physicians on the land from maintaining or
performing ancillary services for their own patients.

10. SDCH is now developing, with other partners, a 47,000 square foot medical facility
on the property adjoining Lakeview Hospital, including a 16,000 square foot out-patient surgical
center (the "Medical Center").
11. The Medical Center will perform functions currently being performed by Lakeview
Hospital, including those traditionally performed by general acute care hospitals, such as
Lakeview. SDCH is providing the land for the Medical Center, will be a tenant, and will share in
the profits from it.
12. On March 2, 2000, HCU filed a Notice of Lis Pendens, which was recorded in the
office of the Davis County Recorder.
It is unclear from either party which parcels of land contain restrictive covenants. In
addition, it is also unclear which parcels of land HCU named in it's Notice of Lis Pendens.
Finally, the exact location of the proposed development on the various parcels has not been
provided to the Court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate "only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Doit, Inc. v. Touche. Ross & Co.,
926 P.2d 835, 841 (Utah 1996); see also Bevnon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge #1743. 854 P.2d
513, 514-515 (Utah 1993); and Alf v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co.. 850P.2d 1272, 1274 (Utah
1993).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must examine the evidence in "a
light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment." Hunt v. Hunt. 785 P.2d 414, 415
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(Utah 1990). However, summary judgment is appropriate even on factual issues where the
evidence is such that reasonable persons could not disagree. Harline v. Barken 912 P.2d 433,
439 (Utah 1996).
Allegations or denials in the pleadings are not a sufficient basis 1* n »>pp< isuiw suiiifiiai /
judgment. See Hall v. Fitzgerald. 671 P.2d 224 (Utah 1983). When a motion for summary
judgment is filed and supported

oi affidavits (CM other material allowed as evidence

in such cases), the party opposing the motion has an affirmative duty to respond with affida
other

«

~ of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See D&L Supply v.

Saurini. 775 P.2d 420 (Utah 1989); Thavne v. Beneficial. L'Liii int, h ' " f > ( i i<"»11"(jfi 1994). .
DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
If i«; tti M| iili»,(!iii!n! VIH ilit f Kin II i , (|| need to use one or more of the properties
containing a non-competition covenant as parking for the Medico

itn

MC'll conlciuls lluit •

^ 1)(1" , vil1 iHi'd r use, either directly or indirectly, one or more of the restricted properties in
such a manner. SDCH claims that none of the parcels containing restrictive covenants will be
used in a manner inconsistent with the restrictive covenant. The use of the said parcels cniil.iininn
the i estric

ly a material issue of fact, which precludes summary judgment.

This is true because the Utah Supreme Court has opined that llir rffivin

ilui.ninn mil a restrictive

i:< i iiiiiiii when a duration is not expressed, is a reasonable time. To determine what a reasonable
time is in a given case, the Coin t mi ist considei the cii ciimstances surrounding the inclusion of the
restrictive covenant in the deed, as well as the purpose of its imposition. Metiupulitan inv. i"u ..v.
SjJI^. ' ^ J1 'cl'Hii »i |lnai

M'O.-I

I his is a factually sensitive analysis that must be
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undertaken at trial. Thus, if the proposed treatment facility or any of its appurtenant parking lots
ildpfiatfidjon^ffliof the restricted deeds, it is possible that the restrictive covenant is still valid and
binding. This cannot be determined on the facts presently before the Court.
There is also a factual issue as to whether the Medical Center will be used for commercial
purposes to third party users, or if it will be used merely for physicians' existing patients. HCU
contends that the Medical Center will provide acute medical treatment on a commercial basis to
third party users. SDCH, on the other hand, contends the Medical Center will be used by
physicians to treat their existing patients. It is unclear what constitutes an "existing patient" for
the purposes of this restrictive covenant. This fact is also clearly material. If SDCH intends to
use the facility for physicians' existing patients, as opposed to newly acquired patients, then
-SDCH is not in violation of the restrictive covenant, even if the treatment facility or its
appurtenant parking lots will be located on the restricted parcels.
Given the fact that there are at least two genuine issues of material fact, the Court finds
that summary judgment is inappropriate at this time. However, the Court finds that partial
summary judgment may be appropriate on certain issues, to be discussed below.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
As a matter of law, this Court concludes the Agreement between HCA and SDCH did not
impose an obligation on SDCH to refrain from competing with HCA for an indefinite period of
time. The plain wording of the Agreement places only one restriction on SDCH with respect to
not competing with HCU: to cease operating its present 74-bed general acute care hospital. It is
undisputed that SDCH met this obligation. The unambiguous wording of the contract imposes no
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other restrictions on SDCH. Thus, this Court finds that SDCH has fulfilled its obligation under
the Agreement, and the SDCH is entitled to partial summary judgment on the issue of an express
ciifili.nliiiil ih\h (ii

iiiiii " ill* Agreement.

. .--v. •

'• The Court next addresses the issue of whether then-wdh .in ininlii.'i.l m VHWIIIII IUI Sin il
not to compete with HCA for an indefinite period of time with respect to operating an general
acute medical facili*

,

.

l J .2d 48 (1999), the Utah

. Pro Image. Inc..

Supreme Court held that it is improper for a court to look beyond lln ln.ni of I lit- MH H;IU iniilcss
it is unclear or ambiguous. If a contract is ambiguous or unclear on its face, extrinsic evidence is
appropriate to determine the intent"

,ourt must first determine

whether the contract was unclear or ambiguous.
I Ii i s i 1111 1 111111 111.11 11 ic Agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face. The Agreement
binds SDCH to only one relevant obligation:

*

re hospital The

Agreement is silent with respect to any other non-competition restrictions. Silence, however, is
not ambiguity

uafted by attorneys for the benefit of a client fully

encompass the client's intentions. In addition, the Court will constaii a\i\ « unli;,n;1 uumisl Ihe
it in the present case, HCU drafted the Agreement and had the opportunity to
enumerate additional conditions and oMi^aiioni

t W m Thus, because the Agreement

is clear on its face, it is inappropriate for the Court to speculate as to what the parties' intent
were by entertaining extrinsic evidence SDCH is entitled to summary judgment as to the
existence of any implied contractual right.
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Furthermore, even if extrinsic evidence were allowed and the Court found there was an
implied covenant restricting SDCH from constructing and operating a general acute facility, this
Court finds that such a restrictive covenant would be overly broad. The four requirements for a
valid restrictive covenant are that: (1) the covenant not to compete must be supported by
consideration; (2) no bad faith may be shown in the negotiation of the contract; (3) the covenant
must be necessary to protect the goodwill of the business; and (4) the covenant must be
reasonable in its restrictions in terms of time and geographic area. Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy,
120 Utah 2d 608, 619, 237 P.2d 823, 828 (1951).
In the present case, there is ample evidence SDCH and HC A mutually exchanged
promises and obligations, thus satisfying the consideration element. There are no allegations that
either HCA or SDCH had bad faith in negotiating their Agreement, so the Court will presume
good faith. Since HCA explicitly required SDCH to shut down its current facility, the Court
further infers that HCA sought the goodwill created by SDCH. In addition, since neither party
has raised the issue of geographic area, the only remaining issue is whether this implied covenant
is reasonable with respect to it's duration.
In Allen, supra., the Court held, "restrictive covenants are generally upheld by the courts
where they are necessary for the protection of the business for the benefit of which the covenant
was made and no greater restraint is imposed than is reasonably necessary to secure such
protection. See also 9 A.L.R. 1456, 20 A.L.R 861, 67 A.L.R 1002, 98 A.L.R. 963, and 155
A.L.R. 652

This is consistent with Restatement of Contracts. Second § 188d:

The extent of the restraint is a critical factor in determining its reasonableness.... If
the promise proscribes types of activity more extensive than necessary to protect
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those engaged lnTby the promisee, it goes beyond what is necessary to protect his
legitimate interests and is unreasonable.
In the present case, HCU had an interest in requiring SDCH shut down its present general
acute facilit

!

\ •i

The Court presumes HCU's purpose in so doing

was to avoid having to compete with the predominant general a

i

1 ia v i s i ( H nil) J • •>;' • n return, HCU obliged itself to keep its prices in check for four years. The
Court presumes HCU's obligati

nat the hospital would not

unduly burden it with rapidly increasing rates to cover its costs of the new Lake view Hospital it
v

is convinced that HCU would not have imposed on it a restriction to

not raise its prices for four years if it did not think

mount of time, while it

may be true that a covenant not to compete for four years may be necessary to protect HCU's
interest in establishing iKdf n*. SIM "11 \ t vplacement, • • - .ourt finds that a 27 year restriction is
overly broad, and thus is invalid as a matter of law.
LIS PENDENS AS AN UNLAWFUL LIEN
The Court now addresses whether HH I unl i fi'P'v |iLn:rd a wrongful lien on SDCH's
property when it filed a Notice of Lis Pendens with the office of the Davis Count H *
clearly established

-

lien on the owner's interest in real property. A

lien discourages potential purchasers since the land is use*'

udgment i 11 I he

renders an unfavorable judgment against the landowner.
SDCH contends that HCt Jfileda w« ont'tii'l lien against it infilingits Notice of Lis
Pendens, Utah Code Annotated § 38-9-1(6) defines "wrongful lien" as:
Any document that purports to create a lien or encumbrance on an owner's
interest in certain real property and at the time it is recorded or filed is not: (a)
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expressly Buthurizedisythirehap^
authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction in the state; or (c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document
signed by the owner of the real property.
The applicable section at issue is subsection (a), which requires that the Lis Pendens has to be
authorized by statute. The only pertinent statute dealing with the Lis Pendens is Utah Code
Annotated §§ 78-40-1 and 2. These sections authorize thefilingof a Lis Pendens "in actions that
affect title to and/or the right to possession of land." Thus, the party that files the Lis Pendens
must have a legal property interest in the parcels listed in the Notice.
HCU contends that the current Utah Wrongful Lien statute specifically excludes the filing
of a Lis Pendens from its coverage. This presupposes that the Lis Pendens was properly filed.
As support for its proposition that itsfilinga Notice of Lis Pendens was properly filed, and thus
not wrongful, HCU cites Hansen v. Kohler. 550 P.2d 186 (Ut. 1976). HCU asserts Hansen
establishes the proposition that filing a Notice of Lis Pendens is not wrongful when the underlying
lawsuit affects the use of, as opposed to affecting the title to or possession of, certain land.
Although Hansen indeed addresses when a Notice of Lis Pendens is improper, this Court
finds that HCU's asserted proposition is nowhere in the body of the opinion. The plain wording
of Utah Code Annotated §§ 78-40-1 and 2 requires that the action has to affect title to and/or the
right to possession of land. HCU has not alleged any right to title to any of the parcels described
in the Notice of Lis Pendens. Neither has HCU alleged any right to possession of these said
parcels.
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Even if HCU had a legitimate property interest in one of the parcels listed in the Notice,
J It I) tailed lo specifically state in its Complaint any property interest or right to any of the said
parcels. In Winters v. Schulman. 199^

* >*•.>••- \ ~ r " 9 9 9 ) , t h e

Utah Court of Appeals held that the Lis Pendens was invalid because the (
fitihi' In iitliiuv,'- iiiii" m or possession of the property as required under § 78-40-2. {See comment
8, paragraph 2). The United States Supreme Coi II t has also 'held that the opening pleadings of a
party who intends to rely on operation of the doctrine of Lis Pendens with respect to property
involved

elude an adequate description of the property through information

displayed in the pleadings. See Miller v. Sherry,

-

HUN t co if

I It 'U had a legitimate property interest, it failed to adequately describe in its Complaint both this
interest and the particula- . .- * -

i an interest. Therefore, the Court finds

that HCU's Notice of Lis Pendens was improperly filed, and thus is a wrongful (HI
AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM
SDCH has moved the Court for tanr it i file jm -unuklcd -iiiswer and counterclaim.
SI >CH cannot file the amended answer and counterclaim without leave of the court, I low ;^ rr,
Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "leave shall be freely given when
justice so requires." In this case SDCHfiledits answer o;

j mt . is

Pendens discussed above on March 2, 2000, approximately 1 1/2 months after SDCH filed its
answer. The Lis Pendens is one (

)CH's proposed amended

answer and counterclaim. The Court concludes that the interests of justic
allowing SDCI11 « lilr flic umended answer and counterclaim, and leave is hereby granted.

KULING
Based on the foregoing, the Court rules that SDCH's Motion for Summary Judgment is
hereby DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. Furthermore, SDCH is given leave to file its
amended answer and counterclaim. Counsel for SDCH is directed to prepare an order in
accordance with Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial Administration.
Dated June

2£-

2000.

BY THE COURT
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling on June
^?2^—; 2000, postage prepaid, to the following:

George K.Fadel #1021
170 West 400 South
Bountiful, UT 84010
James S. Lowrie (USB #2007)
Lewis M. Francis (USB #6545)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK &
MCDONOUGH
Wells Fargo Plaza
170 South Main St., Ste. 1500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

Michael S. Edwards
Law Clerk to the
Honorable Michael G. Allphin
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